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 Chapter 3 
 Resource Allocation and Priority Setting 
 Norman  Daniels 
3.1  Resource Allocation in Public Health 
 There has been much discussion of resource  allocation in medical systems, in the 
 United States and elsewhere. In large part, the discussion is driven by rising  cost s 
and the resulting budget pressures felt by publicly funded systems and by both 
 public and private components of mixed health systems. In some publicly funded 
systems, resource allocation is a pressing issue because resources expended on one 
disease or person cannot be spent on another disease or person. Some of the same 
concern arises in mixed medical systems with multiple funding sources. 
 Although much has been written on resource  allocation issues in medicine, there 
has been less discussion about how resource allocation affects public health. Federal, 
state, and local public health budgets in the United  State s constrain investments in 
health at those levels. In this regard, they are more like some foreign medical 
 systems than the more fragmented and mixed public-private medical system of the 
United States. In the context of budget cuts domestically and in many countries 
responding to an economic downturn, how to invest (and allocate) public health 
resources is a pressing issue. 
 Most investments in public health aim to reduce  population health  risk s, but 
some risks are greater than others, and  resource allocation decisions must respond 
to risks. Sometimes resource allocation decisions focus on the immediate payoff of 
reducing risks from a specifi c disease, whereas other resource allocation decisions 
affect the infrastructure needed to respond to health risks over time. In addition, 
resource allocation decisions may determine who faces risks—the distribution of 
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risks matters, not just the aggregate impact. Resource allocation in public health 
thus focuses on deciding  what risks to reduce—which depends in part on their 
 seriousness as  population factors and who faces them—and  how to reduce risks. 
 The cases in this chapter that discuss resource allocation force us to contemplate 
decisions about priorities in public health as opposed to the more frequently 
 discussed medical issues about health care priorities. Later we suggest that making 
decisions about these issues should be part of a deliberative process that emphasizes 
transparency,  stakeholder  participation , and clear, relevant reasoning. 
3.2  Collective Lessons from the Cases 
 Collectively, these resource allocation cases bring out several important points. 
Separately, they raise other central issues. It is worth noting these general issues 
before commenting on the more specifi c problems raised by each case. 
 The  fi rst  point the cases collectively make is that  effi ciency has ethical and not 
just economic importance (Daniels et al.  1996 ). If one health system is more  effi cient 
than another, it can meet more health needs per dollar spent than the less effi cient 
one. If we want systems to meet more health needs, and we should, then we prefer 
more effi cient health systems. Specifi cally, if we think we have  obligations to meet 
more health needs, or if we think meeting more “does more good,” and we ought to 
do as much good as we can with the resources we have, then we have an ethical 
basis for seeking more effi cient health systems. The economic pursuit of effi ciency 
should not, then, be dismissed as something that has no ethical rationale. 
 A second point the cases collectively make is that  effi ciency is not the only goal of 
health  policy , for we have concerns about how health benefi ts are  distributed as well as 
how they add up. Health policy is not only concerned with  improving  population health 
as a whole, but also with aiming to distribute that health fairly (Daniels  2008 ). That 
means many  resource allocation decisions involve competing health policy goals. 
 The point about competing goals is illustrated by a problem often encountered in 
policy decisions: should we always favor getting the best outcome from the use of a 
resource, or should we give people “fair” chances to get a benefi t if it is at least 
signifi cant (Brock  1988 )? For example, during an  i nfl uenza pandemic, should we 
allocate ventilators to those with the best chance of survival, or should we give 
 signifi cant but lesser chances to a broader group? 
 Reasonable people often disagree about when the difference in expected benefi ts 
means we should favor best outcomes over fair chances, or even about what counts 
as a fair chance. Hence, a third point emerges from the cases taken collectively: 
 reasonable people often disagree about the choice, and it is not possible to simply 
dismiss one side as irrational or insensitive to evidence and argument (Daniels and 
Sabin  2008 ). Indeed, reasonable people will disagree about how much priority to 
give to the sickest (or worst off) patients. They may think we have to weigh the 
seriousness of an illness against the potential benefi t that we know how to deliver, 
they may disagree about how to trade off those considerations, or they may disagree 
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about when modest benefi ts to larger numbers of people outweigh greater benefi ts 
 delivered to fewer people. Together these “unsolved rationing” problems—the best 
outcome versus fair chances problem (when to prefer best outcomes to fair chances), 
the priorities problem (how much priority to give to those who are worst off), and 
the aggregation problem (when do modest benefi ts to more people outweigh signifi -
cant benefi ts to fewer people)—mean that there is pervasive ethical disagreement 
underlying many  resou rce allocation problems (Daniels  1993 ). 
 There are other common sources of disagreement. One of the most common 
sources of controversy in  resource allocation decisions arises when a particular inter-
vention is seen as the last chance to extend life by some—a necessity if we are to act 
compassionately—and when it is seen primarily as an unproven intervention by others 
that we have no  obligation to provide it. Denials of such interventions in last-chance 
cases have been considered the “third rail”  of resource allocation  decisions (Daniels 
and Sabin  2008 ). Here we have two competing public  value s—compassion and stew-
ardship—and most public offi cials would prefer to be seen by the public as commit-
ted to saving lives rather than as  ha rd-nosed stewards of collective resources. 
 The cases taken collectively bring out one fi nal point: our  main analytic tools for 
aiding  resource allocation decision  making are limited in several ways, particularly 
by insensitivity to various ethical issues, especially issues of distribution. In short, 
these tools may take the fi rst point, about the importance of  effi ciency , seriously, yet 
fail to help us with the second and third lessons the cases collectively bring out, that 
we are also interested in distributing effi ciently produced health fairly, and that rea-
sonable people disagree about how to do that. To see this, consider two widely used 
tools:  comparative effectiveness research (CER) , which has been given prominence 
as a  r esearch focus in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of  2010 , and 
 cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) . Both help to answer policy- making questions. For 
example, a typical use of CER compares the  effectiveness of two interventions 
(drugs, procedures, or even two methods of delivery), and  policy makers may want 
to know if a new technology is more effective than older technologies. 
 Of course, they may also want to know if the new technology provides additional 
effectiveness at a reasonable  cost , which points to a shortcoming of much CER in 
the United  State s, where considerations of cost are generally avoided. Similarly, if 
there is only one effective  treatment for a condition, CER tells us nothing useful. It 
also tells us nothing about whether a more effective intervention is worth its extra 
cost. And, CER cannot help us compare intervention outcomes across different 
 disease conditions, since it uses no measure of health that permits a comparison of 
effectiveness. Indeed, decision makers face many resource allocation questions that 
cannot be answered by CER, even if CER can help avoid wasteful investments in 
interventions that do not work or that offer no improvement  ov er others. 
 In Germany, however, CER is combined with an  economic analysis that takes cost 
into account and that allows the calculation of “ effi ciency frontiers ” for different classes 
of drugs (Caro et al.  2010 ). Presumably, this method could be extended to different 
classes of public  health interventions if they are grouped appropriately. To calculate an 
effi ciency frontier, the effect of each drug in a class in producing some  health outcome 
is plotted against its  cost , and the curve is the effi ciency frontier for that class of drugs. 
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It is then possible to calculate if a new intervention in that drug class improves  effec-
tiveness at a price more or less effi cient than what is projected from  the existing effi -
ciency frontier. This use of CER allows German decision  makers to negotiate the price 
of treatments with manufacturers, rejecting payments that yield ineffi cient improve-
ments. German  policy makers can then cover every effective intervention sold at a price 
that makes it reasonably effi cient. Still, because German use of CER cannot make 
comparisons across diseases, it allows vast differences in  effi ciency across conditions. 
 CEA aims for greater scope  than  CER. It deploys a common unit for measuring 
 health outcomes , either a  disability-adjusted life year (DALY) or a  quality-adjusted 
life year (QALY) . This unit purports to combine duration with quality, permitting us 
to compare health states across a range of disease conditions. With this measure of 
health effects, we can construct a ratio (the incremental  cost-effectiveness ratio, or 
 IC ER) of the change in costs that results from the new intervention with the change 
in health effects (as measured by QALYs or DALYs). We can then calculate the cost 
per QALY (or  DAL Y) and arrive at an effi ciency measure for a range of interven-
tions that apply to different  condi tions. 
 Critics have noted  p roblematic ethical assumptions in the construction of the 
 health-adjusted life-year measures and in the use of CEA (Nord  1999 ; Brock  2004 ). 
To see some of these problems, consider the following table:
 Rationing problem  CEA  Fairness 
 Priorities  No priority to worst off  Some priority to worst off 
 Aggregation  Any  agg regation is OK  Some aggregations OK 
 Best outcomes/Fair  ch ances  Best  outcome s  Fair chances 
 CEA systematically departs from judgments many people will make about what 
is fair. The priorities problem asks how much priority we should give to people who 
are worse off. By constructing a unit of health  effectiveness , such as  the QALY, 
CEA assumes this unit has the same  value , regardless of who gets it or wherever it 
goes in a life (“A QALY is a QALY” is the slogan). But intuitively, many people 
think that a unit of health is worth more if someone who is relatively worse off 
(sicker) gets it rather than someone who is better off (less sick) (Brock  2002 ). At the 
same time, people generally do not think we should give complete priority to those 
who are worse off. We may be able to do little for them, so giving them priority 
means we would have to forego doing more good for others. Few would defend 
creating a bottomless pit out of those unfortunate enough to be the worst off. 
 Similarly, CEA assumes that we should aggregate even small benefi ts. Then, if 
enough people get small benefi ts, it outweighs giving large benefi ts to a few. But 
intuitively, most people think some benefi ts are trivial goods that should not be 
aggregated to outweigh larger benefi ts to a few (Kamm  1993 ). Curing many  people’s 
colds, for example, does not  outwei gh saving a single life. 
 Finally, CEA favors putting resources where we get a best outcome, whereas 
people intuitively favor giving people a fair (if not equal) chance at a benefi t. 
Locating an  HIV/AIDS  treatment clinic in an urban area may save more lives than 
placing a clinic in a rural area, but in doing so, we may deny many people a fair 
chance at a signifi cant benefi t (Daniels  2004 ). 
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 In all three of these examples of rationing problems, CEA favors  a  maximizing 
strategy, whereas people making judgments about  fairness are generally willing to sac-
rifi ce some  aggregate  population  health to treat people fairly. In each example, whether 
it is giving some priority to those who are worse off, viewing some benefi ts as not 
worth aggregating, or giving people fair chances at some benefi t,  fairness deviates from 
the health maximization that CEA favors. Yet we lack agreement on  principle s that tell 
us how to trade off goals of maximization and fairness in these cases. People disagree 
about what  trades they are willing to make, and this ethical disagreement is pervasive. 
 Determining priorities primarily by seeing whether an intervention achieves  some 
 cost/QALY  standard is adopting a health maximization approach. This approach departs 
from widely held judgments about fairness, even where people differ in these judg-
ments. Thus, the  National Institute of Clinical and Health Excellence (NICE) in the 
 United Kingdom has had to modify its more rigid practice of  approving new inter-
ventions only if they met a cost/ QALY  standard in the face of recommendations from 
its Citizens Council. This council, intended to refl ect representative social and ethical 
judgments among British citizens, has proposed relaxing NICE’s threshold in vari-
ous cases where judgments about  fairness differed from concerns about health maxi-
mization. The judgments of the Citizens Council in  this  regard agree with what the 
social science literature suggests are widely held views in a range of cultures and 
contexts (Dolan et al.  2005 ; Menzel et al.  1999 ; Nord  1999 ; Ubel et al.  1999 ,  2001 ). 
 There are, of course, those who criticize departures from the NICE threshold of 
the sort that the Citizens Council recommended. Compromising the maximization 
of health that CEA promotes may be seen as a moral error, perhaps the result of 
elevating the rescue of an “identifi ed” victim (say, a cancer patient whose life might 
be extended modestly by a new drug)  ove r benefi ts to “statistical” lives (using the 
resources to provide greater benefi ts to others). The reasonable disagreement about 
how to proceed suggests that we should view CEA as an input into a discussion 
about  reso urce allocation, not as an algorithm for making decisions. This “aid to 
decision making” role was proposed by the  Public Health Service in its recommen-
dations about the use of CEA (Gold et al.  1996 ). In short, controversial ethical 
 positions are embedded in CEA, and using CEA uncritically commits one to these 
views, even though many disagree with them. 
3.3  Specifi c Ethical Issues in Resource Allocation 
 We have already noted that the  effi ciency of a health system has ethical  consequences. 
But what should we count as  effi ciency ? Should we use our resources to generate 
more revenues for a unit of the health system—say, a hospital? Doing so would 
defi ne effi ciency the way most businesses do: other things being equal, an allocation 
that produces a greater return on investment is a more effi cient use of stockholder or 
owner resources. Alternatively, we might narrow the range of effects to health effects 
on the covered  population . Then we have greater effi ciency when an allocation pro-
duces more positive health effects in that population than an alternative allocation. 
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 The case Guzmán brings from  Colombia raises this issue forcefully. Should 
 hospitals, or a specifi c health plan, allocate resources favoring services (certain 
 treatment s) that raise more revenues than an alternative allocation (certain preven-
tive measures)? Perhaps the gains from the treatments will involve fewer  population 
health gains over time than those obtained by the preventive or  health promotional 
measures, even if they show their improvement more quickly and so look better 
sooner. Which plan should the  policy maker adopt? 
 This issue examines our purpose in designing a health system. Is it to meet the 
health needs of a population or is it to provide a good return on investment for those 
who invest in health services? We might think that this question is easier to answer in 
a system where health care delivery is seen largely as a public undertaking aimed at 
improving population health. In such a system, it might seem that there is only one 
purpose behind the health care system. Return on  investment  for the taxpayer  funding 
such a system should be measured by how effi ciently the system  improves  popula-
tion health. In systems where resources are owned privately (and there are many of 
these), however, it seems we must consider at least two goals. Even if the private 
sector must in part seek to improve  population health , which may be a requirement 
of state-imposed health care  regulation or, in some people’s opinions, a social respon-
sibility of corporations, private health-care organizations still must deliver a reason-
able return on investment for owners. Thus,  policy makers within private health-care 
organizations have a dual task. Balancing return on investment with improvement in 
 populatio n health thus becomes the central issue in the Colombian case study. 
 The Chilean case written by Gómez and Luco raises a similar issue, but this case 
focuses on measurable differences in the  cost effectiveness of certain services and 
in the severity of two conditions. If we consider only cost effectiveness, we view 
 effi ciency in one way—the best  health outcomes in the aggregate for the population 
for an investment in health. If we take severity of condition into account, we might 
view this as an  equity demand—in which case, we have an effi ciency-equity  confl ict 
and must make a trade-off. Or, we might think of effi ciency as a ranking of needs by 
severity of condition. In the latter, the resource allocation case turns on how we 
defi ne effi ciency. Specifi cally, the Chilean category of Guaranteed  Health Interventions 
could include  cataract surgery (the leading cause of blindness in the Chilean population), 
but not  multiple sclerosis (MS)  treatment s, which might be viewed as maximizing 
effi ciency in a  standard sense. Or, the Guaranteed Health Interventions scheme 
could include the less cost-effective treatment of MS but not cataract surgery, since 
MS is viewed as a more severe condition (because it can be life threatening and lead 
to premature death), even if it is far less prevalent than cataracts. If this were the 
case, the more effi cient system, in this nonstandard view, would rank treating more 
severe conditions as more effi cient than treating less severe conditions. If budget 
limitations mean only one should be included in the Guaranteed  Health Interventions 
program, either  M S or cataract surgery, which should it be? 
 The  cataract surgery intervention delivers a signifi cant benefi t in terms  of QALYs 
to a larger part of the  population than does the intervention package for MS, but the 
greater severity of premature death seems to be an important reason for favoring 
MS. If this reason is given priority over  cost effectiveness and over the standard 
view of  effi ciency , then are less effective treatments for more severe conditions 
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 supposed to have priority over more effective and cost-effective treatments for less 
severe conditions? If so, what kind of a health system does that produce if all needs 
can not be  met  given resource limits? Alternatively, do we want a system that always 
 we ighs cost  effectiveness more highly than the severity of a condition that some 
people have? That too seems  problem atic. 
 Suppose we think improving  population health is a worthwhile and defensible 
goal of a health system, we favor improving population health over increasing 
 revenues for the private sector (in the Guzmán case), and we also favor giving prior-
ity to cost effectiveness over severity of a condition (in the Gómez and Luco case). 
A  confl ict still remains between health maximization in the aggregate and concerns 
about  equity , as illustrated in the Blacksher and Goold case (and arguably in the 
case about  triage in  pand emics by Smith and Viens). 
 In the case that Blacksher and Goold describe, the task is to decide whether to 
 reallocate resources from a program focused on  maternal-child health and reduction 
of  b lack-white  in fant mortality  dis parities to a program that may get more health per 
dollar spent through other interventions.  Infant mortality among blacks and whites 
has declined rapidly in the United  State s; and in absolute terms, the decline has been 
more rapid for blacks. Still, the ratio of black infant mortality to white infant mortal-
ity has increased. Because the public health department is in a highly segregated 
city, this shift in program focus might seem to require viewing the remaining  bl ack- 
white health  d isparities as morally  a cceptable (especially given the high rate of 
improvement that past programs gave to black infant mortality rates). When should 
we view  health disparities as morally acceptable? When should we weigh reducing 
health disparities as more important than some aggregate gains in health that we 
know how to produce in a  population ? If public health has two goals—improving 
 population health and distributing that health fairly—how should we weigh the 
goals when they confl ict? 
 One important feature of the Blacksher and Goold case, namely the opinions 
within the community whose  inequalities are at issue, is really a feature to which 
nearly all cases warrant attending. People affected by a  policy ought to have some 
 infl uence in determining that policy. Some people might believe this is what  democ-
racy  requires. A diffi culty this view of democracy faces, however, is that those who 
speak for the community may not appropriately represent the community affected 
by the decision. Nevertheless, the opinions of a broader range of  stakeh olders may 
improve deliberation (depending on how those opinions are managed). It may also 
improve the acceptance of the decisions, which arguably enhances the legitimacy of 
the  decision-making process . 
 Resistance to including a broader range of  stakeholder s in decision making about 
health priorities may come from a concern that they bring with them “partiality.” 
This resistance may come from the view that greater impartiality leads to better 
deliberation. Arguably, this concern about partiality ignores the positive gains that 
partiality often brings to deliberation, especially if we know how to manage such 
deliberation so that we minimize the  risk s that partiality sometimes brings. We need 
such management skills in any case since partiality is unavoidable in most contexts. 
Rather than banning what cannot be eliminated, managing partiality in deliberations 
is the best way to improve decision making in contexts of reasonable disagreement. 
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 The  confl ict between improving  population health and treating people fairly can 
arise in other contexts. Arguably, the problem raised by Smith and Viens about the 
 principle that should govern  triage in  pande mics can be viewed as a confl ict between 
health maximization, in this case, saving the most lives, versus recognizing the 
claims that the sickest people have on us for assistance. Ordinarily, health systems 
give some priority to those who are sickest, but should that priority disappear in favor 
of saving lives when scarce resources, such as ventilators, are allocated in pandemic 
conditions? If we allocate our ventilators to the sickest patients, we may save fewer 
lives than if we allocate them to those whose lives we can better expect to save. Even 
if we think we should give priority to those worst off, do we ordinarily think that 
concern for them should govern triage  policy in pandemics? If we believe saving the 
most lives trumps concerns about helping those who are sickest in  pandemics, can we 
justify why the priority we give to the sickest should be revised in pandemics? 
 Suppose we have an acceptable way of measuring the burden of disease in a  popu-
lation , and according to this measure, mental illness is not given the priority it ought 
to have. That is, it contributes more to the burden of disease than is normally recog-
nized in  standard health systems, which provide too few services to meet  mental 
health needs. This is the problem upon which Rentmeester et al.’s case focuses. 
Specifi cally, some mental health conditions require signifi cant resources for what 
 Medicaid terms as “behavioral management,” which is seen as a social support 
 service not a medical  treatment . As a result, these services, to the extent they are 
provided, fall to state-funded social service budgets. The services place a burden on 
state fi nances that would be diminished if they were instead included in Medicaid 
 bud gets (50 % of which are fi nanced by each state). Arguably, the  stigma that attaches 
to  mental health issues is one important reason for this underprovision of social sup-
ports for people with mental health issues. In Nebraska, the  political opposition to 
 expanded  Medicaid coverage through the Affordable Care Act  ad ds to the burden on 
state budgets and the potential under-servicing of these mental-health induced needs. 
 It takes resources to meet public health needs. Suppose we can increase the resources 
to meet some of those needs by accepting a  pu blic-private partnership that improves a 
compromised private partner’s image? Should we meet health  n eeds at this price? 
 That is the issue posed by the Hernández-Aguado case from  Spain . Specifi cally, 
should public health authorities put their stamp of approval, in the form of their 
logo, on fl u epidemic notices printed on soft drink labels? The  inclusion of the logo 
is a requirement of the private entities that are willing to donate space on the labels 
of their products. Obviously, this provides a form of public support for soft drinks 
that arguably contribute to  obesity in a population and thus to the prevalence of 
 noncommunicable diseases associated with obesity. But in view of the low budgets 
available for fl u warnings, is this a price worth paying? What would the decision 
maker have to know about the effects of such labels to decide this case, or is the 
decision something that can be made independently of the specifi c payoffs of imple-
menting the warning system? Is there a way to consider  the  cost and assess whether 
the outcome of the warning is worth this price? Is this simply an  effi ciency calcula-
tion about the  cost effectiveness of reducing a  disease burden in this way? 
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3.4  Decision-Making Process 
 One fi nal crosscutting issue lurks behind all the cases in the resource allocation 
chapter (perhaps all the cases in the volume)—namely, the nature of the decision- 
making process that addresses the issues they raise. Public health decisions about 
resource allocation—judging from the cases on that topic in this volume—face 
 reasonable ethical disagreement. That is because the tradeoffs involved in the two 
main goals of  public health policy — improving  population health and distributing 
health fairly—are trade-offs about which people often reasonably disagree. How 
can public health decisions be made in real time, given these ethical disagreements, 
in ways that enhance their legitimacy and are arguably fair to all parties? 
 One approach to the problem is to construct a fair process for making those  decisions 
and to rely on the outcomes of such a process. People will judge the outcomes of a fair 
process to be fair (Daniels and Sabin  2008 ). What  conditions  should such a decision-
making process meet if it is to be considered fair? Four conditions are arguably neces-
sary (even if some may think they are not suffi cient and want to add others):  (1) The 
decisions and the rationales for them should be made  public. (2) They should be based 
on reasons all think are  relevant. (3) They should be  revisable in light of new evidence 
and arguments. And  (4) , these conditions should be  enforced so that the public can see 
that they obtain. Some explanation is needed for these conditions. 
 The publicity condition is widely embraced, even if it is fairly strong. It calls for 
the grounds for decisions—not just the content of the decisions—to be transparent. 
People have a right to know why decisions that affect their health are made the 
way they are. Moreover, making the reasoning for such decisions public is a way of 
exposing them to scrutiny so errors in reasoning or evidence can be detected and 
decisions improved. Even though we may not be able to be explicit  in  advance about 
all criteria we use to decide such cases, that is, we may work out our reasons through 
deliberation, we can explain on what we base our decisions. And that gives people 
affected by our decisions the knowledge they have a right to possess. 
 The search for reasons that all consider relevant to making a reasonable public 
health decision about resource allocation can narrow disagreement considerably. 
Even if people can agree on what reasons they think are relevant—in the spirit of 
fi nding mutually justifi able grounds for their decisions—they may not agree about 
the weight they give these reasons. One way to test the relevance of such reasons is 
to subject them to scrutiny by an appropriate range of  stakeholder s. What counts as 
appropriate may vary with the case. Who should be heard in deliberations is itself 
worthy of deliberation. Stakeholders raise different arguments that should be heard, 
and including their voices improves buy-in to decisions. Since stakeholders may not 
in many instances be elected representatives, we may be skeptical about whether the 
democratic process is improved by including them, but, if the deliberation is well 
managed, the quality of the discussion may improve greatly. 
 The  revisability condition , requiring that decisions be modifi able in light of new 
evidence and argument, is also widely embraced and not considered controversial. 
Decisions are made on the basis of evidence and arguments, and better evidence and 
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arguments may emerge that require revisiting some decisions. Some  decisions  can 
then be modifi ed, though it may be too late for others, and our consolation is that we 
made the best choices we could, given the evidence and arguments. 
 The intent of the  enforcement condition is to ensure that the other, more substan-
tive, conditions are met. Sometimes enforcement is a matter of state  regulation . 
Sometimes it can be the result of  vol untary conformance with a process. 
 Since  ethical disagreements abound in  resource allocation decisions , we need a 
process that enhances legitimacy. But can we claim that a decision-making process that 
is fair yields fair outcomes? One view is that we may ultimately become persuaded by 
a good argument that  fairness requires a different decision than one that emerged from 
a fair process. We can in this way defeat the  fairness we might ordinarily attribute to the 
outcome of a fair process. Does the prospect of defeating the fairness of a decision 
emerging from a fair process mean that we should not attribute fairness to the out-
comes? Alternatively, we can admit that the  fai rness that comes from a deliberation is 
only “defeasible” fairness, but it is  the  fairest conclusion we  ca n reach at the time. 
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3.5  Case 1: Priority Setting and Crisis of  Public Hospitals 
in Colombia 
 María  del  Pilar Guzmán Urrea  
 Department of Community Medicine 
 El Bosque University 
 Bogotá ,  Colombia 
 e-mail: mapiguzmanu@gmail.com 
 This case is presented for instructional purposes only. The ideas and opinions 
expressed are the author’s own. The case is not meant to refl ect the offi cial position, 
views, or policies of the editors, the editors’ host institutions, or the author’s host 
institution. 
3.5.1  Background 
 During the 1990s, many  Latin American countries began reforming their health sys-
tems according to a neoliberal development model that emphasizes free markets 
(Homedes and Ugalde  2005 ; Stocker et al.  1999 ). Approved in 1993,  health reform in 
Colombia was supposed to overcome problems such as low coverage, inequality in 
access and use of health care services, and ineffi ciency in the allocation and distribu-
tion of resources. But the reform also hoped to encourage more focus on illness  pre-
vention and  health promotion and more  community participation in health 
decision- making processes. The reformers advocated predominantly for neoliberal 
 value s like effi ciency, free choice, universality, and quality. Although they were also 
committed to the  communitarian values of  solidarity ,  equity , and social  participation . 
 The Colombian  health reform was one of the fi rst examples of implementing 
 managed competition in the developing world (Plaza et al.  2001 ). To stimulate com-
petition among insurers and health service providers, both public and private, health 
reformers applied the theory of managed competition (Enthoven  1993 ).  According 
to this theory, competition achieves effi ciency and reduces  cost , making health care 
services responsive to  consumer needs (Londoño and Frenk  1997 ). Hospitals 
become responsive when they are able to sell services and become fi nancially sus-
tainable. To achieve sustainability, supply subsidies (direct transfers from the state 
to hospitals) had to replace demand subsidies (transfers directed to the poor through 
a subsided  s ecurity plan). 
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 The Colombian reform established a General Social Security System in Health 
that featured two insurance plans:  (1) The Contributory Plan, fi nanced by manda-
tory contributions (formal employees and employers from the public and private 
sectors).  (2) The Subsidized Plan, funded by resources from the Contributory Plan 
and from taxes and other sources, which covered people unable to pay (Vargas et al. 
 2010 ). The actors of the system are the insurance companies, the health service 
providers, and the state regulatory organizations. Insurance companies contract 
with health service providers, and the regulatory organizations control  compliance 
with the defi ned basic health packages. 
 To optimize resources, the reform placed controls on medical practitioners and 
established explicit priority criteria based on  clinical guidelines that defi ned benefi t 
packages. From 1993, some adjustments to the reform have been introduced, such 
as the creation, in 2012, of the Institute for Health Technology Assessment to 
 provide  a n evidence base for health decisions. The Institute recommends which 
medical technologies should be paid with public resources on the basis of which 
technologies optimally improve the quality and  cost effectiveness of medical care. 
To determine these technologies, it conducts  health outcomes  research that guides 
technology development, evaluation,   and use (Giedion et al.  2012 ). 
 Nevertheless, 20 years later, the promise of reform lies unfulfi lled and many 
patients still experience high out-of-pocket costs, long wait times, or denial of  services. 
To access health services, frustrated citizens are turning to the legal system as a last 
resort and, by so doing, congesting the courts (Defensoría del Pueblo  2012 ).  Physicians 
are responding to economic incentives and  penalties by restricting hospitalization 
time and decreasing the use of expensive diagnostic tests and specialist referrals 
(Abadía and Oviedo  2009 ). To further reduce labor costs,  service providers have 
increased the workload of health  profession als and the number of patients seen per 
day,  whi le reducing the time spent with each patient (Defensoría del Pueblo  2007 ). 
 Insurance companies often take a long time to pay health service providers, and 
they also contract their own service network (a process known as vertical integration), 
so many  public hospitals are in serious fi nancial diffi culties. Meanwhile, hospital 
workers frequently disrupt the normal operation of hospitals as they strike to improve 
work conditions and have their paychecks issued more promptly. Should hospitals 
fail—40 % of the 968 public hospitals in Colombia are classifi ed as being at medium 
or high fi nancial  risk —nearly ten million people could be left without health service 
(Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social  2012 ; Quintana  2002 ). Add to that, the 
reforms have increased inequity, as more affl uent patients can more  easily access 
quality health care services than can low-income patients (Vargas et al.  2010 ). 
 The described problems refl ect a complex situation that requires profound 
 structural reform . As one way to address the immediate problems of  effi ciency and 
quality, Colombia in 2012 instituted  public hospital accreditation. Accreditation 
requires hospital directors to reach goals in service delivery related to fi nancial 
 viability, quality, and effi ciency. Hospital boards can now fi re directors who fail to 
meet these  g oals within a specifi ed period (Rodríguez  2012 ). Given the imbalances 
between budgets, service demands, and  ongoing  costs, hospital directors face enor-
mous challenges and ethical  dilemmas in formulating and executing their 
 mana gem ent plans. 
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3.5.2  Case Description 
 You are a director of a  public hospital that focuses on  health promotion and  prevention 
activities, such as general practice, dentistry, clinical laboratory, hospitalization, 
and emergency care. In developing your management plan, you must make deci-
sions about which services to  prioritize . If you prioritize services that represent 
higher revenues and lower costs as a way of conserving resources, you may have to 
reduce priority for some services. To guide your decision making, you conducted a 
retrospective study of service billing in the past 2 years and learned that the clinical 
laboratory and external medical consultation yielded higher incomes. The lowest 
yielding programs in the short term— vaccination , educational programs to improve 
 lifestyles , and provision of micronutrient  supplements to  children and pregnant 
women—were associated with the best long-term health results. 
 Taking seriously your fi duciary responsibilities, you try to guarantee fi nancial 
sustainability by containing labor costs,  restricting  consultation times, and shorten-
ing hospital stays. Your challenge is to do these things without diminishing the 
quality of patient care. But because you compete with other institutions, you must 
also assure suffi cient reserves to maintain and update medical equipment that will 
improve the “sale of services.” Knowing that every management decision you make 
will affect the  population you serve, you begin to refl ect on the  factors  affecting 
your  h ospital  man agement  plan. 
3.5.3  Discussion Questions 
 1.  Who are the major  stakeholder s in this case and what are their interests,  value s, 
and moral claims? Between which of them are there ethical  confl ict s or 
tensions? 
 2.  Which of these interests, values, and moral claims should be prioritized? How 
would you justify your priorities? 
 3.  Would you prioritize programs that in the short term brought in needed revenues 
or those programs that had highest impact long term? 
 4.  How can tensions between the goals of effi ciency, fi nancial viability, and quality 
be resolved? What weight should be assigned to each goal by the hospital board 
when evaluating your performance? 
 5.  At least in the short run, the new reforms seem to be prioritizing effi ciency, via-
bility, and quality over  equity . Should a health system attain the former goals 
before tackling the problem of equity, or should it insist on equity from the start? 
 6.  Can equity in health care be achieved without doing something about wealth 
inequity and other social determinants of health? 
 7.  Should you justify your decisions by emphasizing solidarity with other hospital 
directors and seeking community support? 
 8.  How could collaborations between public health, communities and the health care 
system begin to address neoliberal  concern s with effi ciency, viability, and quality? 
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 This case is presented for instructional purposes only. The ideas and opinions expressed 
are the authors’ own. The case is not meant to refl ect the offi cial position, views, or 
policies of the editors, the editors’ host institutions, or the authors’ host institutions. 
3.6.1  Background 
 The Global Burden of Disease (GBD) compares disease burdens based on epidemio-
logical measures of prevalence, mortality, disability, and associated  cost s. The GBD 
for mental illness amounts to 14 % of the world’s total disease burden (World Health 
Organization  2005 ).  I n the United  State s alone, every fi fth child suffers from a mental 
disorder (Perou et al.  2013 ). Although mental illness clearly causes disabilities (Prince 
et al.  2007 ), underservice to those with mental illness is commonplace. Lack of access 
to mental health services counts as the fi rst of many hurdles facing families who have 
a child with a mental illness.  Stigma and the lack of parity in health coverage for 
physical and mental illness are other hurdles for these families. Not surprisingly, these 
hurdles can critically affect the development  of  children with mental illness. 
 Lack of access to mental and behavioral health services  for  children 5 years and 
younger especially threatens their development. Rapid brain growth occurs in the 
fi rst 5 years of life, which lays the foundation for cognitive, emotional, and moral 
development. Exposure to chronic stress can prompt the release of hormones in the 
brain that can have enduring consequences for how the adult brain is organized and 
how it functions (Shonkoff and Phillips  2000 ). Because poor health can show up in 
children as developmental delay, access to mental and behavioral health services is 
critical. Longitudinal studies demonstrate positive and long-acting effects of early 
childhood interventions, such as environmental enrichment programs, on a range of 
cognitive and noncognitive skills, social behaviors, academic achievement, and 
adult job performance (Heckman  2008 ). The  esti mated annual rate of return on 
investment from targeted early childhood development programs is 7 %, and early 
intervention reduces the predictable need for higher, more costly levels of care in 
later life (Heckman et al.  2010 ). 
 In the United  State s, Medicaid is a government-funded program that provides 
health coverage to people with certain disabilities and to low-income adults and 
their children. The Federal Medicaid Act (FMA) requires states participating in 
Medicaid programs to provide  medically necessary  treatment to eligible children. 
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Under federal Medicaid  law , states must provide “early and periodic  screening , 
diagnostics, and treatment,” also known as EPSDT services, to eligible Medicaid 
recipients under age 21 (U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B)). The defi nition of EPSDT 
includes  necessary health care , diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures 
described in the Medical Assistance subchapter for the United States Code (42 
U.S.C. § 1396d (a)) (2012) that correct or ameliorate defects and physical and men-
tal illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening services, regardless of 
whether such services are covered under the state plan (42 U.S.C. § 1396d (r)(5)) 
(2013). The  medical necessity  standard , which is based on clinical standards of care, 
refers to interventions that may be justifi ed as reasonable, necessary, or appropriate. 
States must comply with the FMA standard to cover all treatments for a Medicaid-
eligible child’s physical or mental condition, even if service coverage is optional for 
adults covered by Medicaid. FMA also bars states from arbitrarily denying or reducing 
the amount, duration, or scope of a required service to an otherwise eligible recipient 
solely because of the diagnosis, illness, or condition (Nebraska Legislature  2012 ). 
 Despite the provisions of FMA, the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, which oversees the Medicaid program, excludes certain behavioral health 
treatments for children with developmental disabilities and autism (National Health 
Law Program  2012 ; Autism Society of Nebraska  2012 ). In addition, some states’ 
Medicaid contracts allow insurers more  freedom than other states to deny payment 
for services. States also vary in who—the claimant or the insurer—must prove 
whether coverage provisions are adequate or fall short of federal Medicaid legal 
standards (Rosenbaum and Teitelbaum  1998 ). Differences among states in approval 
of payment for specifi c treatments, including mental and behavioral health treat-
ment, illustrate the need for more consistency in Medicaid coverage provisions and 
the lack of parity between mental and physical health coverage. Mental health ben-
efi ts must be offered at parity with medical services to newly eligible recipients as 
part of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), and Medicaid 
expansion controversy is clear evidence that parity is a work  in progress (Mental 
Health America  2013 ; U.S. Department of Labor  2008 ). 
 Because of inadequate coverage for mental and behavioral health services for 
Medicaid-eligible  children , some  parents have no option other than to surrender their 
child to the child welfare system so that the child will receive full coverage for neces-
sary mental and behavioral health care services. This results in signifi cant cost-shift-
ing from Medicaid to the state’s child welfare system. That is, when a state provides 
federally mandated services to Medicaid-eligible children, it receives a fi nancial 
match from the federal  government to pay the  cost s. When a state denies federally 
mandated Medicaid services and a family surrenders a child to state custody so the 
child can receive care, the state pays the expense of the previously denied Medicaid 
costs plus the expense of entitlements the child acquires as a ward of the state. 
 The ACA Medicaid expansion offers a window of opportunity to increase cover-
age for behavioral health  treatment for children with mental illnesses. Although the 
federal government will bear the primary fi nancial burden of Medicaid expansion, 
some states have elected, for  political reasons, not to participate in this expansion. 
For participating states, ACA Medicaid expansion will replace state and local men-
tal health services funds with federal Medicaid money that will cover a wider range 
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of home and community-based services for mental illness treatment (Bazelon 
Center for Mental Health Law  2012 ). 
 Public health agencies and leaders often provide input for the Medicaid system, 
helping to develop protocols, criteria, and rules about which treatments are defi ned 
as  medically necessary . Such decisions about medical necessity affect clinicians, 
patients, and families because they determine which treatments get recommended at 
the clinical level and infl uence which treatments insurers cover. 
3.6.2  Case Description 
 You are the Medicaid director of a state with the country’s highest percentage of 
 children in the child welfare system. Twenty-fi ve percent of children in the state’s 
foster care system are there not because of abuse or neglect, but because of behav-
ioral problems and mental illnesses. As a state offi cial, you are aware that this results 
 in  signifi cant cost-shifting from Medicaid to the state’s child welfare system. 
 Recently, the case of 4-year-old Sam has come to your attention. Sam’s family 
cannot afford mental and behavioral health care for Sam, although he is Medicaid- 
eligible and insured through Magiscare (a private company with a state contract to 
administer Medicaid for mental and behavioral health services). Sam’s  parent s are 
considering surrendering their boy to become a state ward to get him the mental 
health services he needs. 
 Sam, you learn, eats random objects and dirt, throws tantrums, bangs his head on 
the ground, hits and bites himself and others, and often runs away. Recently diag-
nosed by his physician as having autism, Sam was referred to a psychologist who 
recommended outpatient behavioral therapy. Both the physician and the psycholo-
gist expect this therapy to be covered through the family’s Magiscare plan. 
 Magiscare denied the psychologist’s requests for payment on the grounds that, 
for children of Sam’s age, behavioral management is not covered under state  law 
because it is not “medically necessary.” Magiscare substantiated their denial of 
 payment because Sam’s behaviors primarily refl ect developmental disabilities 
related to autism, which are not covered under their contract with the state. When 
you ask the Magiscare executive director about this case, she suggests that Sam’s 
 parent s could attend therapy sessions to help them cope with their son’s behaviors, 
but she reasserts that behavioral management is not covered for children as young 
as Sam under state law because it is not medically necessary. 
 Members of the state legislature and child mental health advocacy groups are try-
ing to expand access to home-based and community-based mental health services. 
They have asked you to support their efforts. You also consider that your governor, 
who is your boss, has publically stated his fi rm opposition to ACA Medicaid expan-
sion, thus denying the state the opportunity to expand coverage for children’s mental 
and behavioral health  treatment through the ACA. At present, you know that your 
state is offering limited mental and behavioral health  service s and that narrow defi ni-
tions of  medical necessity are used to limit access to those services. 
 As the state Medicaid director, which steps should you take? 
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3.6.3  Discussion Questions 
 1.  Who are the main  stakeholder s in this case, and what are their primary interests? 
 2.  “Passing” the expense of coverage denied by Medicaid to other components of pub-
lic service, such as the  child  welfare system, has fi scal and social implications.
 (a)  What are some of these implications? 
 (b)  How should prevalence, mortality, disability,  and  cost be factored into think-
ing about ways to balance short- and long-term  risk s and benefi ts to indi-
viduals and to the public in this case? 
 3.  Suppose a  policy advisor warns that expanding behavioral health care for  chil-
dren will strain the Medicaid budget and require cuts in services for adults or 
reduce their eligibility.
 (a)  How should you respond? 
 (b)  Which considerations or priorities would guide your funding allocations? 
 4.  What role should ethical  principle s such as  stewardship ,  public health leader-
ship , and  moral courage play in this case? 
 5.  Medical necessity implies an acute care model of health service delivery and 
refl ects a clinical perspective. How well does this idea apply to a public health 
 prevention model of health service delivery? Are there better alternatives? 
 6.  Parity in insurance coverage for mental health is federally mandated for private 
insurers, which covers most citizens, but has proven to be an elusive goal for 
people who do not have private insurance or do not have enough coverage. 
 Medicaid is a public ( government funded) insurance program, not a private one. 
Although Medicaid benefi ciaries receive coverage for medically necessary men-
tal health services,  e ach state defi nes  medical necessity uniquely.
 (a)  Should a federal mandate defi ne  medical necessity for mental and behavioral 
services? 
 (b)  What fi nancial implications would such a mandate have from a state per-
spective and from an overall perspective? 
 7.  The term  principle-policy gap can be used to characterize situations in which 
most people support health coverage in  principle ; but in practice, they are unable 
to pay for coverage or unwilling to take the  political , social, cultural, or fi scal 
 risk s necessary to enable such coverage. What do such gaps tell us about which 
 value s the majority favors, and how might the term  principle-policy gap help us 
understand the dynamics in this case? What roles should public health leaders 
play in responding to principle-policy gaps? 
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 This case is presented for instructional purposes only. The ideas and opinions 
expressed are the authors’ own. The case is not meant to refl ect the offi cial position, 
views, or policies of the editors, the editors’ host institutions, or the authors’ host 
institutions. 
3.7.1  Background 
 Public health systems are usually underfunded in comparison with health care sys-
tems. In fact, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries allocate on average only 3 % of their health spending to  pub lic 
health and  prevention activities (OECD  2011 ). This low funding of public health 
programs hinders the capacity to implement effective public health policies (Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation  2011 ). 
 Population health challenges, such as infl uenza pandemics, are increasingly 
complex, and tackling them involves urgently executing a wide array of public 
health measures to prevent disease transmission. In the case of infl uenza pandemics, 
measures can vary from border quarantine, social distancing, provision of antivirals 
and  vaccine s, and personal hygiene strategies. Recommendations often need to be 
made quickly even when knowledge about the seriousness and potential health and 
social effects are incomplete. The target for preventive interventions is the entire 
population. However, resources for intense and sustained health campaigns through 
mass communications are expensive. In addition, the social determinants of the dis-
ease must be understood and considered (Crowcroft and Rosella  2012 ). This typi-
cally involves the need for policies that engage the health and non-health sectors, 
such as educational policies and social or economic factors (Savoia et al.  2012 ). 
This complexity, together with decreasing funds and other factors, has contributed 
to increasing private sector involvement in health care. 
 According to  the  World Health Organization (WHO), a public-private partner-
ship gathers a set of actors for the common goal of improving  population health 
through agreed roles and  principle s. This may also be described as public sector 
programs with private sector participation (WHO  2013 ). WHO has described sev-
eral types of partnerships, including philanthropic, transactional, and transforma-
tional. Sponsorship is a form of a public-private partnership defi ned as “any form of 
monetary or in-kind payment or contribution to an event, activity, or individual that 
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directly or indirectly promotes a company’s name, brand, products, or services” 
(Kraak et al.  2012 ). In this sense, sponsorship is a commercial transaction, not type 
of philanthropy. 
 Public-private partnerships have become increasingly common for public health 
campaigns. Some transnational companies and their corporate foundations collabo-
rate with public institutions, such as United  Nation s agencies and  government s, to 
tackle complex public health problems, such as  treatment of diarrhea in developing 
countries (Torjesen  2011 ),  tuberculosis , and malaria (Ridley et al.  2001 ). These  col-
laboration s have been encouraged by international institutions and experts as a way 
to mobilize resources and expertise, which could complement the public sector. 
WHO has also encouraged using public-private partnerships to deliver health ser-
vices for a range of health problems, including HIV infection,  malaria ,  tuberculosis , 
trachoma, and vaccine-preventable diseases (Buse and Walt  2000a ,  b ). However, 
corporations’ increasing role in public health has been criticized as jeopardizing the 
mission of public health and its commitment to population health (Hastings  2012 ; 
Ludwig and Nestle  2008 ). Some corporations have used tactics that discredit public 
health actions, such as distorting scientifi c information and using fi nancial tactics 
and  political infl uence to avoid unfavorable regulations (Wiist  2011 ). 
 Public health  profession als, public health agencies, and governments often must 
decide whether to collaborate with the private sector to improve population health. 
These decisions are increasingly frequent as health department budgets shrink and 
public-private partnerships are seen as a way to secure funds for core public health 
programs. Ethical considerations can help us decide whether and when to form such 
partnerships. However, the available public health ethics frameworks (e.g., Public 
Health Leadership Society  2002 ; Nuffi eld Council on  Bioethics  2007 ; Kass  2001 ) 
do not specifi cally discuss public-private partnerships. Only the Public Health 
Leadership Society provides guidance for  such  collaborations.  Principle 10 pro-
poses that, “Public health institutions and their employees should engage in collabo-
rations and affi liations in ways that build the public’s trust and the institution’s 
effectiveness.” Continued discussion about the ethical implications of private-public 
partnerships is needed. 
3.7.2  Case Description 
 Top health offi cials in an industrialized country have declared a public health emer-
gency due to an infl uenza pandemic. The head of the country’s health department 
receives a call from the president of a multinational company that produces sugary, 
high-calorie drinks. The company president expresses his concern about the pan-
demic and wants to collaborate with the  government to prevent the spread of fl u. 
The company offers the health department a considerable amount of space, one- 
third of each can, on its star product (a soft drink) free of charge, to include mes-
sages on fl u  prevention . The company insists that the health department logo be 
included on the can along with the preventive messages. For them, the association 
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between the health department (through the logo) and their product is essential for 
the  collaboration as it would be an acknowledgement by the health department of 
the company’s social responsibility. 
 The head of the health department arranges a meeting with several health authori-
ties and offi cials to consider the offer. On one side, some members of the group sup-
port the proposal because of the need to carry out far-reaching public health 
campaigns to limit the impact of pandemic fl u. At that stage, the incidence of pan-
demic fl u is increasing quickly and the number of new outbreaks in  schools is wor-
rying the health authorities and the  population . There have been recent budget cuts to 
the health department, and some offi cials argue the company’s contribution may be 
the best option to ensure a far-reaching campaign on prevention measures to benefi t 
the population. They see sponsorship as a form of social responsibility because the 
company does not have any apparent economic interest in fl u-related activities. They 
also note that there are no other companies offering a similar collaboration. 
 But other offi cials say the company’s soft drink products contribute to the  obe-
sity and diabetes epidemic and that the company’s use of the health department logo 
would label it a pro-health industry with the backing of the highest health authority 
in the country. They also raise concerns about risking the independence of the health 
department in future regulatory action on sugar-rich beverages. 
 As the  hea d of the health department, you must decide if you should collaborate 
with the company. 
3.7.3  Discussion Questions 
 1.  What considerations should the health department director weigh when deciding 
whether to collaborate with the beverage company? 
 2.  Who are the major  stakeholder s the health department should consider, and what 
 value s might each of these stakeholders bring to this decision? 
 3.  In making your decision, what values should be prioritized? 
 4.  What positive or negative impacts would displaying the health department logo 
on the soft drink cans have on health department operations? 
 5.  How might sponsorship by a company that produces sugary beverages affect 
public trust in the health department and the institution’s effectiveness? 
 6.  Would the decision be different if the company produced healthy foods and the 
department’s logo was placed on a healthy product? 
 7.   Would community involvement facilitate decision making and the consideration 
of the ethical questions? What ethical criteria or guidance should be established 
to accept or reject a future donations or sponsorship of a public health program 
by a company? 
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 This case is presented for instructional purposes only. The ideas and opinions expressed 
are the authors’ own. The case is not meant to refl ect the offi cial position, views, or 
policies of the editors, the editors’ host institutions, or the authors’ host institutions. 
3.8.1  Background 
 Preterm births, the leading cause of infant mortality, are increasing annually worldwide 
(World Health Organization  2012 ).  The United  State s shares company with Nigeria, 
India, and Brazil among the top ten  countri es with the highest numbers of preterm births 
and ranks 31st among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
nations in infant mortality (OECD  2010 ). Within the United States, racial and ethnic 
disparities in infant mortality remain entrenched and have increased (MacDorman and 
Mathews  2009 ). U.S. health  policy leaders have made the elimination of health dispari-
ties a top public health priority (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  2011 ; 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services  2011 ). Infant mortality is an important 
area of focus for  eliminating  disparities, both in its own right and because the rate of 
infant mortality serves as an indicator of the nation’s health due to its association with 
maternal health, social and economic conditions, racial discrimination, access to health 
care, and public health practices (MacDorman and Mathews  2009 ). 
 During the twentieth century, U.S. infant mortality declined 93 % (MacDorman 
 2011 ). In 1900, about 100 infants died per 1000 live births. By 2000, that number 
fell to 6.89. During the last half of the twentieth century, the rate of black infant 
mortality dropped dramatically. In 1950, black infant mortality was 43.9 deaths per 
1000 live births compared with 26.8 deaths per 1000 live births among whites 
(Mechanic  2002 ). But by 1998 black infant mortality fell to 13.8 deaths per 1000 
live births compared with 6.0 deaths per 1000 live births among whites. As these 
numbers show, both groups made signifi cant absolute gains, with blacks gaining 
more in absolute terms—a reduction of 30.1 for blacks and 20.8 for whites. Yet, 
black infant mortality still remained about twice that of whites. 
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 These disparities have persisted in the twenty-fi rst century. In 2006, non- Hispanic 
black women experienced the highest  rate of infant mortality, with 13.4 infant 
deaths per 1000 live births, while non-Hispanic white women had a considerably 
lower rate, with 5.6 infant deaths per 1000 live births. Citing a 2006 report from the 
National Healthy Start Association, MacDorman and Mathews ( 2009 ) report that 
programmatic efforts to reduce disparities in black-white infant mortality have had 
some successes at local levels, but eliminating the disparities is diffi cult. 
 The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services have prioritized both the elimination of health dispari-
ties and improvement in overall  population health. These twin goals—one distribu-
tive, the other aggregative—are separate and sometimes  confl ict (Anand  2004 ). 
Increases in health disparities often accompany advances in aggregate gains in popu-
lation health (Mechanic  2007 ). Although this case is specifi c to the United  State s, the 
dilemma is not. Data show that signifi cant progress on child mortality has been made 
in many countries but that this overall success is often coupled with increased 
inequalities between advantaged and disadvantaged groups (Chopra et al.  2012 ). In 
China and India, for example, disparities in mortality persist between boys and girls 
younger than 5 years, a function of entrenched gender discrimination (You et al. 
 2010 ). These examples raise challenging questions about how ethically to assess 
such cases and set priorities for the allocation of scarce public health resources. 
3.8.2  Case Description 
 You serve as the director for the local health department in a racially segregated 
urban city in the Midwest with one of the greatest concentrations of African 
Americans in the United States. The city has a long history of civil rights activism 
that led to protests and marches that ultimately empowered and mobilized black 
communities and organizations. Your health department has a history of prioritizing 
maternal-child health and the elimination of black-white disparities in infant mor-
tality in its programs, an investment of resources affi rmed by the city residents 
through the department’s community outreach program and planning processes. 
 Chronic  underfunding  of public health, made worse by the economic downturn, 
has resulted in drastic and unprecedented reductions in the public health budget. In 
consultation with your staff and community board of health, you have raised the 
possibility of redirecting resources from maternal-child health into other programs 
based on a number of practical and ethical considerations. As with national statis-
tics, the city has seen signifi cant declines in black infant mortality, even as black- 
white disparities remain. You note that although the maternal-child health programs 
are cost-effective, their impact on reducing black-white disparities seems to have 
stalled. Other programs appear to meet targets more consistently. To help support 
these other programs, you note that allocating resources to more effective programs 
provides more “health” per dollar, thus meeting the utilitarian demand to maximize 
overall health, which many view as the primary goal of public health and health 
 policy (Powers and Faden  2006 ). In addition, although black-white disparities in 
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infant mortality persist, blacks have made signifi cant gains, declining more than 
whites in some decades. You note that remaining inequalities could be deemed ethi-
cally acceptable by some  standard s of  equity , such as the “maximin”  principle . 
Although this distributive principle is subject to interpretation (Van Parijs  2003 ), it 
is generally understood to require that social and economic inequalities work to 
benefi t society’s least advantaged groups. Thus, inequalities (even signifi cant ones) 
are morally acceptable as long as the least advantaged have signifi cantly benefi ted 
(Powers and Faden  2006 ). 
 The director of community outreach proposes that the health department not 
make this decision unilaterally, but instead listen to community opinions on these 
questions of priorities and fairness. He suggests that the health department collabo-
rate with community partners to host a series of public forums. He insists that a 
topic of such historic and contemporary concern to the community must be subject 
to public deliberation. Despite having a history of supporting community discus-
sions, you are concerned about  the  cost of community forums, noting that they will 
drain resources from an already slim budget. 
3.8.3  Discussion Questions 
 1.  Have local health departments met their ethical obligations when community 
health improves overall, but health disparities persist? If not, why not? If so, on 
what grounds? 
 2.  Is there something about infant mortality that makes it special in considerations 
of fairness? If so, what is it? 
 3.  Should the role of race and racism in infant mortality shape priority setting and 
the allocation of resources in public health? If so, why? 
 4.  On what grounds and how should you as the local health department director 
make resource allocation decisions? What  standard s—evidence,  principle s of 
 justice , public opinion—should infl uence priority setting? 
 5.   Should the community have a role in identifying community health priorities or, 
more specifi cally, in providing input into allocation decisions that directly affect 
them? If so, how should the community be involved and who represents the 
community? 
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3.9  Case 5: Priority Setting in  Healt h Care: Ethical Issues 
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 This case is presented for instructional purposes only. The ideas and opinions 
expressed are the authors’ own. The case is not meant to refl ect the offi cial position, 
views, or policies of the editors, the editors’ host institutions, or the authors’ host 
institutions. 
3.9.1  Background 
 The Chilean  Sy stem of Guarantees in Health—created by  law in 2004—aims to 
establish guaranteed health care interventions in health promotion, disease and 
injury  prevention , diagnosis and  treatment , rehabilitation and palliative care 
(Ministerio de Salud  2004 ). The law mandates that public and private insurers pro-
vide the resources needed to protect the public against excessive health-related 
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spending and guarantee timely and universal access to authorized interventions 
based on  standard s of care. 1 
 National health objectives, established by the Ministry of Health, determine the 
list of guaranteed interventions. This list, however, is reviewed every 3 years and 
amended as new scientifi c and health information emerges. As of 2013, the System 
 o f Guarantees in Health included interventions for 80 health-related conditions 
(Ministerio de Salud  2013 ), accounting for almost 60 % of the Chilean burden of 
disease. The System of Guarantees in Health is a priority system based on acknowl-
edged criteria, namely scientifi c evidence and socially shared  value s. For the system 
to be effective, the criteria must be transparent, publicly accepted, and open to 
review and modifi cation. 
 The  law that created the System of Guarantees in Health also mandated a proce-
dure for selecting the guaranteed interventions (Ministerio de Salud  2004 ). The 
procedure factors in public opinion  research to identify social consensus on health 
priorities, studies to identify effective interventions that prolong and improve qual-
ity of life, and assessments of interventions’ cost effectiveness (Burrows  2008 ). The 
procedure determines priorities with an algorithm that includes these factors and 
information on disease burden and health system capacity (Missoni and Solimano 
 2010 ). After choosing the health interventions, the health ministry elaborates on a 
package of interventions related to specifi c health conditions and develops clinical 
 guide lines  for  such interventions. 
3.9.2  Case Description 
 You direct a team within the Ministry of Health that is responsible for recommend-
ing priorities for guaranteed health interventions. The priority ranking system 
emphasizes the selection of cost-effective interventions for conditions with the 
greatest burden. However, the health ministry also has authorized including expen-
sive interventions that are less effective or treating health conditions with low prev-
alence, if that condition or those interventions signifi cantly impact health. Because 
of budget reductions, a number of interventions are under review. Your team has 
been asked to recommend funding interventions for two health 
conditions—cataract (a common condition with highly effective  treatment ) and 
multiple sclerosis (a less prevalent condition but one with signifi cant health and 
social impact). 
1  Law 19.966 for the System of Guarantees in Health includes the following defi nitions for guaran-
tees:  Guaranteed Access —Public and private health insurers must grant the resources to provide 
guaranteed interventions;  Guaranteed Opportunity —Guaranteed interventions must be delivered 
within a deadline established in the protocols elaborated by the Ministry of Health;  Guaranteed 
Quality: Interventions must be delivered by registered and accredited health care providers; 
 Financial Protection —A maximum copayment is established to avoid the insured falling into 
fi nancial insolvency. 
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 Cataract, the main  cause  of blindness, primarily affects people over 40. This 
health problem has a high impact as measured by quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs) (Ministerio de Salud  2007 ). Its surgical treatment is effective for 80–95 % 
of patients. The package of guaranteed interventions includes diagnostic confi rma-
tion within 180 days after suspected diagnosis and surgical treatment 90 days after 
confi rmation. In 2013, it was expected that 48,424 cataract surgeries would be 
performed in Chilean public hospitals and 416 in private institutions. 
 Multiple sclerosis , an autoimmune infl ammatory disease leading to demyelin-
ation in the central nervous system, produces a progressive deterioration of health 
and quality of life. It represents a minimal disease burden at the  population level, 
mainly due to premature death. In Chile, it is estimated that 385 patients are treated 
for multiple sclerosis each year. The package of guaranteed interventions includes 
diagnostic confi rmation within 60 days; confi rmed cases must receive treatment 
within 30 days. Treatment includes pharmacological therapy and  p hysiotherapy. 
3.9.3  Discussion Questions 
 1.  What are some of the ethical, scientifi c, and social considerations that should be 
weighed in deciding if interventions for both cataract and multiple sclerosis 
should be covered by the System of Guarantees in Health? 
 2.  Is there an obligation for health systems to cover all health problems affecting a 
population? Are there limits? 
 3.  How should health problems be prioritized and who should have the authority to 
make these decisions? Which criteria should receive the most weight in ranking 
priorities? 
 4.  How should resources be distributed among health conditions affecting many 
people versus health conditions affecting few people? 
 5.  How should resources be distributed among procedures that are preventive ver-
sus treatments for existing conditions? 
 6.  How does taking a public health perspective versus a clinical medicine perspec-
tive affect your thinking about including these two conditions in the System of 
Guarantees in Health? 
 7.  What role should transparency play in the selection procedure? 
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 This case is presented for instructional purposes only. The ideas and opinions 
expressed are the authors’ own. The case is not meant to refl ect the offi cial position, 
views, or policies of the editors, the editors’ host institutions, or the authors’ host 
institutions. 
3.10.1  Back ground 
 Infectious diseases such as pandemic infl uenza and severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) have attuned the attention of  policy makers and health practitioners 
to the importance of protecting and promoting the public’s health in the face of 
increased care needs and extreme resource scarcity. In particular, acute care needs 
for the critically ill and discussions of  treatment priorities have been the subject of 
much debate in pandemic planning (Hick et al.  2007 ; Melnychuk and Kenny  2006 ; 
Uscher-Pines et al.  2006 ). This is not surprising, as it has been estimated that more 
than 700,000 Americans may require mechanical ventilation during a pandemic, far 
outnumbering available ventilators (Rubinson et al.  2010 ; U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services  2005 ). Additionally, shortages of hospital beds, person-
nel, and other equipment can be expected during a pandemic, which may limit the 
ability to meet an expected increase in patient  volu me (World Health Organization 
 2008 ). 
 Prudentially planning for the public’s increased care needs during a pandemic 
requires assessing surge capacity, especially in critical care units (CCU). However, 
as pandemics increase in severity, they can overwhelm critical care capacity and 
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contingency arrangements. To make the best use of resources and personnel (even 
in the absence of a pandemic), patients are triaged—evaluated to determine the type 
and priority of care to be received. While medical information informs the develop-
ment of triage criteria, ethical considerations about triage goals—whether explicit 
or implicit—also play a role. For public health emergencies that overwhelm capac-
ity, some propose adjusting critical care triage criteria to emphasize certain public 
health goals, like saving the most lives possible (Christian et al.  2006 ; Silva et al. 
 2010 ). 
 Some contend that utilitarian reasoning should predominate in critical care tri-
age, based on the intuition that, when resources are scarce, allocation decisions 
should produce the greatest good for the greatest number (Charlesworth  1993 ; 
Childress  2004 ). Critics of  utilitariani sm reply that it requires coercion or covert-
ness to succeed, because the public will not voluntarily sacrifi ce their lives or their 
loved ones for the greater good (Baker and Strosberg  1992 ). Utilitarian triage may 
be unpalatable to the public on the further ground that it quantifi es and judges the 
 value of one life over another, which could disproportionally impact particular pop-
ulation groups (Hoffman  2009 ). Others therefore would base triage decisions on 
egalitarian considerations, for instance, by giving everyone an equal chance at 
obtaining a scarce good, an approach for which historical precedent exists (Baker 
and Strosberg  1992 ). 
 Whatever approach is adopted, prior arrangements between  policy makers, prac-
titioners, and the public based on thoughtful,  transparent deliberation about the 
most ethical approach to CCU triage usually will improve the legitimacy of  d eci-
sions. Those who promote an approach based on  fairness  and  equity need to con-
sider that, during public health emergencies, the goal of saving lives may force a 
retreat to utilitarian ethics (Kirkwood  2010 ; Veatch  2005 ). While not necessarily 
unethical in itself, a retreat that overturns prior arrangements lays itself open to 
charges of illegitimacy. 
 Variability in the frameworks used to allocate public health resources illustrates 
the importance of refl ecting upon the  value s that undergird policy decisions and 
individual practices, like critical care triage. Appealing spontaneously in the heat of 
the moment to values that have not been adequately refl ected upon or discussed in a 
 transparent and deliberative manner may lead to undesirable outcomes and accusa-
tions of unethical practices. While discussions of CCU triage criteria ultimately 
concern institutional clinical policy and practice, they refl ect a larger discussion 
about the overarching public health goals in the face of large-scale, widespread 
public health emergencies, like pandemics. 
3.10.2  Case Description 
 An outbreak of a novel infl uenza virus has progressed to the point that  the  World 
Health Organization has declared a pandemic. In the pandemic’s fi rst wave, hospital 
capacities were suffi cient to handle the infl ux of pandemic infl uenza patients, whose 
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morbidity and mortality rates mirrored rates for seasonal infl uenza. However, 
despite a  vaccination campaign and other measures, such as ensuring surge capac-
ity, rates of morbidity and mortality associated with the virus have increased drasti-
cally during the pandemic’s second wave. 
 The resulting increased number of patients needing hospital beds has over-
whelmed even the surge capacity of the CCUs of a metropolitan city’s tertiary care 
hospitals. To meet this challenge, a teleconference has been scheduled between sev-
eral members of the hospitals’ administration, the CCU directors from each hospi-
tal, and public health offi cials involved in leading the jurisdiction’s pandemic 
response. As a public health offi cial who played a central role in developing the 
pandemic plan for your jurisdiction, you have been included on the call to provide 
guidance for the pandemic response. 
 During the meeting, a number of CCU directors report that their physicians and 
nurses are concerned about the type of patients  bein g admitted into the CCU. Some 
of the directors see a trend that they suggest is ultimately undermining the effi ciency 
of the pandemic response. They argue that, as the severity of the pandemic contin-
ues to increase, their triage criteria should be modifi ed so as to use CCU resources 
to save the most lives possible. They worry that admitting those who present with 
the most need is preventing  treatment of those who will benefi t most from CCU 
admission. “So long as our triage scheme saves the most lives, it is ethically justifi -
able” a number of them declare. 
 The group takes up the proposal of a CCU director to triage according to 
Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) scores—which are derived using a 
tool that determines a patient’s organ function and failure rate to predict outcomes 
(Vincent et al.  2000 ). Were the pandemic’s severity to increase, the group suggests 
that, in addition to the CCU director’s proposal to use SOFA criteria, even more 
inclusion, exclusion, and priority criteria could be added with the goal of saving as 
many lives as possible. They’ve proposed exclusion criteria for CCU admittance 
that include patients with a poor prognosis, patients with other known health issues, 
and some mention of age cut-offs, to name a few. 
 Others involved in the teleconference question whether this is the right approach 
to take. They argue that, by aiming to save the most lives possible, those who may 
benefi t less from CCU admission, like older adults or individuals with disabilities, 
will be unfairly affected. They say, “we should not just aim to save lives, but rather 
save lives  fairly .” As you and your public health colleagues are leading the pan-
demic response, the hospital administrators and CCU  di rectors look to you for a 
recommendation or decision about how to proceed. 
3.10.3  Discussion Questions 
 1.  Ensuring that the CCU has surge capacity is a common strategy to accommodate 
an infl ux of patients who have been infected with pandemic infl uenza.
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 (a)  Does surge capability require alternative critical care triage criteria? 
 (b)  If the population’s health needs exceed contingency arrangements, should 
alternative critical care triage criteria be used? 
 (c)  How should these decisions be made? 
 (d)  What principles,  value s, or processes should infl uence these decisions? 
 2.  What considerations might exist during a pandemic that do not exist in everyday 
critical care and critical care triage that do or do not support the modifi cation of 
triage criteria? If pandemic critical care triage requires a unique conceptual 
framework, what principles ought to be valued in such a framework (e.g. need, 
equality, utility, effi ciency)? 
 3.  Would the severity of a pandemic ever warrant the use of a utilitarian scheme for 
critical care triage, given that the public generally fi nds it unpalatable and carry-
ing out such a plan could require coercion? How could an adverse public reac-
tion to coercive or covert measures be mitigated? 
 4.  In a pandemic, the most seriously ill patients with the lowest probability of being 
saved might be left untreated because their care would require too many resources 
with little prospect of recovery. This illustrates a  confl ict between the common 
good and the best interests of individual patients. What other confl icts might 
arise when triaging in a pandemic? 
 5.  Triage can be used to maximize the number of lives saved with available 
resources. Should we aim to maximize the number of lives or, alternatively, the 
number of life years saved? This can also give rise to questions about the quality 
of those lives and years lived. Is it ever appropriate to make allocation decisions 
based on quality of life or life years? 
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